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 Introduction: What Is Ontology? 
What Is Metaontology? 
 1 Ontology  … 
 Biology studies living things. Psychology studies mental functions. Astronomy deals 
with celestial phenomena and mathematics deals with numbers. h ey all study 
 something , of course, but none of them studies  everything . h ey do not address the 
whole of reality, or all that there is. Ontology does.  
 h is characterization of ontology can be traced back to Aristotle, who in Book 
Four of his  Metaphysics introduced the idea of a  ‘ science of being  qua being ’, or of 
being as such. Yet Aristotle did not use (a Greek counterpart of) the word  ‘ ontology ’ 
to name such a science, although the term comes from  ó n, the present participle of 
 e î nai , the Greek verb for  ‘ to be ’. h e word is a more recent seventeenth-century 
coinage (nor did Aristotle use a Greek counterpart of the word  ‘ metaphysics ’  – we 
will get back to this). At er having been dismissed by much early analytic and neo-
positivistic philosophy, ontology made an impressive comeback in the second half of 
the twentieth century. One initiator of the renaissance was Willard van Orman 
Quine, who made mainstream the idea that the task of ontology is to write down 
something like a complete catalogue of the furniture of the world. What we want 
from ontology is a list of  all there is, and ontology gets the list right insofar as it 
misses nothing that is there, and includes nothing that isn ’ t there. 
 However, many still think that there is something perplexing about the study of 
 what there is , which sets it apart from the other above-mentioned disciplines. Laymen 
have a rough understanding of what biology, psychology or mathematics are about, 
and few doubt that living creatures, or the functioning of the mind or the realm of 
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numbers, are legitimate areas of rational investigation. But, i rst, what does it  mean to 
study being  qua being, or what is? And, secondly, via which  methods or procedures of 
inquiry should such a study be carried out? While there are many excellent 
introductions to ontology on the market, few deal extensively with these two 
issues  – questions to which professional philosophers give conl icting answers. 
h is provided our motivation for writing the book. 
 2  … And metaontology 
 As its title makes explicit, this book is an introduction to ontology as well as an 
introduction to  meta ontology. And the term  ‘ metaontology ’ is a very recent coinage: 
as far as we know, it oi  cially entered the philosophical landscape as the title of a 
1998 essay by Peter van Inwagen, one of the greatest contemporary ontologists. Now, 
van Inwagen understood metaontology as dealing precisely with the two issues just 
mentioned: if the key question for ontology, as Quine told us, is  ‘ What is there? ’, 
then the (twofold) key question for metaontology is  ‘ What do we mean when we ask 
 “ What is there? ” ’ , and  ‘ What is the correct methodology of ontology? ’. By using the 
prei x  ‘ meta- ’, van Inwagen meant to suggest a kind of higher level rel ection:  ‘ meta-X ’ 
as the inquiry on the central concepts and procedures of discipline X.  
 It is only natural that the rel ection on the proper methodology of a discipline 
historically comes at er the discipline itself has l ourished and developed its own 
conceptual tools. Perhaps the main element of novelty in early twenty-i rst-century 
ontological research is that many of its practitioners pay more and more attention to 
metaontological issues.  ‘ Metaontology ’, as Ross Cameron 2008: 1 said,  ‘ is the new 
black ’. h is book aims to give a textbook presentation of the discipline in line with 
such recent developments.  
 Now the metaontological turn has brought a rediscovery of some traditional and 
pre-Quinean approaches to ontology. As for the i rst of those two meta-questions, 
 ‘ What do we mean when we ask  “ What is there? ” ’ : the catalogue metaphor embedded 
in the Quinean view has it that the goal of ontology is to write a list of everything that 
falls under the notion  being . But the original Aristotelian idea of a  ‘ science of being 
 qua being ’ was concerned, i rst of all, with the very concept of being, that is, with the 
meaning of the notion itself. Quine did have something important to say on the 
meaning of being, as we will see in the i rst part of the book. Other recently developed 
metaontological stances dif er from the Quinean approach in their conceptualization 
of being as such, and from this they derive dif erent views of ontology ’ s tasks. Some 
say that the primary goal of ontology is not to write a list of all there is, but (as also 
Aristotle set out to do in the  Metaphysics ) to identify the most fundamental or basic 
entities: those which ground all the rest, and on which everything (else) depends. 
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Some claim, as Aristotle himself did, that  being can mean dif erent things  – that there 
are dif erent ways of being  – and that the primary goal of ontology is to identify these 
meanings, or ways of being. Some even introduce a distinction between  being and 
 what is there , and claim that some things should be included in the universal catalogue 
because they are there, although they lack being. 
 As for the second meta-question, namely  ‘ What is the correct methodology of 
ontology? ’, the new methodological consciousness of twenty-i rst-century ontology 
has revitalized del ationist perspectives on the goals and ambitions of ontology 
itself. Quine ’ s methodology for ontology was naturalistic: he believed that we should 
include in the universal catalogue the kinds of entities our best natural science 
commits us to (he also had views on how such  ‘ ontological commitment ’ ought to 
be understood, as we will see). He thus denied that ontology has a special 
philosophical autonomy, allowing it to l oat freely from the i ndings of natural 
sciences. Contrary to the beliefs of his master Rudolf Carnap, Quine believed 
ontological questions to generally make perfect sense and to admit of substantive 
replies. Nonetheless, other philosophers nowadays are much more Carnapian: they 
think that ontological questions make sense only when appropriately restricted or 
qualii ed. Some have a more strongly dismissive approach, and believe that most 
such questions are just shallow: they reduce  – as some founding fathers of analytic 
philosophy also thought  – to confusions concerning the meanings of some 
expressions of our everyday language. 
 3  … And metaphysics 
 Ontology entertains a complicated relationship with metaphysics, which is itself 
one of the most traditional parts of philosophy. h e border between ontology and 
metaphysics in the works of contemporary philosophers is fuzzy. Some just use the 
two terms interchangeably. Sometimes the relationship between metaphysics and 
ontology is understood as of one between a discipline and one of its sub-disciplines. 
 As a i rst approximation, metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which asks what 
reality is like  – as opposed to such other branches as epistemology, which asks what 
we can know about reality and how; or ethics, which asks how reality ought to be. 
Textbook presentations ot en say that metaphysics is an investigation into the most 
 fundamental and  general structures and features of reality (Crane and Farkas 2004; 
Garrett 2006).  
 Just as the word  ‘ ontology ’, so the word  ‘ metaphysics ’ comes onstage later than the 
Greek philosophers who can be considered the founding fathers of the discipline. It 
has a tangled history too. When Aristotle ’ s works were ordered at er his death, some 
of them were put at er his writings on physics. h ey belonged to a discipline Aristotle 
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called  ‘ i rst philosophy ’, and which dealt with such fundamental topics as being, 
causation, God and other issues. Such writings then got the label of  ‘ what comes at er 
the books on physics ’, in Greek:  t à met à t à physik à  – hence,  ‘ metaphysics ’. Physics was 
taken as the study of the material world, subject to change, movement, generation 
and corruption.  ‘ First philosophy ’, as the discipline that studies the most general and 
fundamental aspects of reality, was believed by Aristotle to transcend physics in 
some sense. In order to fully understand the foundations of reality, for him and for 
many others at er him, one has to resort to incorporeal, nonphysical entities, such as 
God. So the name  ‘ metaphysics ’ also came to mean a study that goes  ‘ beyond physics ’ 
in this sense: it deals with a realm that surpasses, or is anyway not reducible to, the 
physical world. 
 Now when ontology is understood the Quinean way, that is as the quest for a 
catalogue of all there is, it may then be seen as in some sense a preliminary to 
metaphysics. One i rst writes down the complete inventory of reality  – one says what 
is there. h en one wonders about the nature, structure and fundamental features of 
the kinds of things listed in the inventory.  
 Even if one agrees with the view of ontology as preliminary to metaphysics, the 
border between the two remains fuzzy: as we will experience throughout this book, 
ontological issues (so understood) naturally tend to shade into metaphysical ones (so 
understood). h inking about the relationship between ontology and metaphysics in 
the aforementioned terms can help to understand the following pattern, ot en 
recurring in contemporary philosophy: authors A and B can seriously disagree on 
the metaphysical status of entities of kind  F , which they nevertheless agree to include 
in the ontological catalogue. Here ’ s one example that we will delve into in the third 
part of the book. h e notion of  possible world is extremely useful in most branches of 
contemporary philosophy. One starts by taking  ‘ possible world ’ to stand for a way 
reality as a whole could be or could have been. h is quickly leads to the natural 
twofold question: are there really possible worlds distinct from the actual one  – that 
is should we include them in the ontological catalogue? And if so, then what kind of 
entities are they? Now philosophers A and B can agree on including possible worlds 
in their ontologies: they both reply  ‘ yes ’ to the i rst ontological question. However A 
thinks that these things (possible worlds) are just like our actual world, but causally 
and spatiotemporally isolated from it. In particular they are, as we may say, (mostly) 
 concrete material objects : things endowed with a mass, which occupy some space and 
are subject to the l ow of time. On the contrary, B thinks of them as  abstract objects  – 
things more similar to numbers, functions and, perhaps, concepts, than to these 
physical surroundings of ours. So A and B have diverging metaphysical views on 
possible worlds. 
 It is fair to say that such characterization of the relation between ontology and 
metaphysics, despite being widespread, is not uncontroversial. To begin with, it is 
possible to accept the ontology-as-catalogue metaphor without taking ontology to be 
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preliminary to metaphysics. If one thinks of metaphysics as an attempt at  ‘ writing the 
book of the world ’ (Sider 2011), then the ontological job will look like writing the 
index of contents to the book of the world. And the index of contents is ot en written 
when the book is close to completion. Some authors, for example, Bergmann 1967 
and Grossmann 1992, believe that we just cannot decide whether some putative kind 
of entities should be included in the ontological catalogue without i rst giving some 
characterization of  what the kind is like. h ese philosophers will tend to understand 
 ‘ ontology ’ itself as meaning the study of the fundamental and most general structures 
of reality. h ey will then tend to use  ‘ ontology ’ just as a synonym of  ‘ metaphysics ’, or 
to blur any distinction between the two (for a comparison between this way of 
understanding ontology and the one followed by us above, see the introduction to 
van Inwagen 2001). Besides, the development of non-Quinean metaontologies, as we 
will see, has brought even more pressure on the mainstream way of drawing the line: 
for it presupposes the  ‘ Quinean catalogue ’ view of ontology, which is questioned in 
some alternative metaontological approaches. h is quick overview should make 
clear that this book, dealing with ontology and its methods, is perforce also, to some 
extent, a metaphysical book. 
 4  … And science, and common sense 
 Let us stick again with the  ‘ catalogue ’ or  ‘ index of contents ’ metaphor for ontology. 
Another natural preliminary question about writing the catalogue or index of 
contents to the book of the world is: what is specii cally  philosophical  – as opposed 
to scientii c, on the one hand, and plainly commonsensical, on the other  – about 
this task?  
 Sciences such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, etc., already teach us a lot 
about the makeup of reality. We can learn, for instance, that the surface area of Saturn, 
measured in square kilometres, is 1.08  · 10 12 (Liggins 2008a), that some biological 
species are cross fertile, that spiders share some important anatomical features with 
insects (van Inwagen 2004), that the event of a solar l are can release several billions 
of joules of energy. Also, we share commonsensical knowledge on lots of things 
constituting the furniture of the world. We know that fragility is a feature of crystal 
glasses, that bananas are yellow when ripe, that a bikini is composed of a bra and a 
slip, that Emmental cheese has holes in it and that the Clinton-Lewinsky af air was a 
scandalous incident. Suppose we look at examples such as these and start writing 
down the following list: 
1 Planets, like Saturn 
2  Insects 
3  Bananas 
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4  Spiders 
5  Bikinis 
6  Holes, for example, in pieces of cheese 
7  Numbers, like 1.08  · 10 12 
8  Properties, such as fragility, ripeness, and genetic features 
9  Biological species 
10  Events, like solar l ares and the Clinton-Lewinsky af air 
11  ... 
 Would a list of this kind tell us an ontologically satisfying story? One problem is that 
it seems randomly constructed. It resembles the classii cation of animals in Borges ’ 
 h e Analytical Language of John Wilkins : 
 h ose that belong to the Emperor 
 Embalmed ones 
 h ose that are trained 
 Suckling pigs 
 Mermaids 
 Fabulous ones 
 Stray dogs 
 h ose included in the present classii cation 
 h ose that tremble as if they were mad 
 Innumerable ones 
 h ose drawn with a very i ne camelhair brush 
 Others 
 h ose that have just broken a l ower-vase 
 h ose that from a long way of  look like l ies 
 One would like to impose more order and structure to our inventory of the furniture 
of the world: we want our list to be  systematic , in some sense.  
 A related issue may be one of insui  cient generality  – though pinning down the 
exact level of generality is no easy task. Ontological catalogues don ’ t typically stick 
with such entries as  bikini, insect or  banana , but comprise much more general 
categories. For instance, we may group planets like Saturn as well as insects, bananas, 
bikinis and human beings like Clinton and Lewinsky into a single very broad category. 
All things belonging to these kinds are, to retrieve a label we used above,  concrete 
material objects : they all have mass, they occupy a place in the physical world.  
 But what about the sixth item in the list? Should we include holes in our catalogue 
of all there is? Holes being devoid of mass, they look quite unlike things belonging to 
the i rst i ve items. Is a hole something like an absence of matter, or a kind of 
nothingness? If so, how can holes exist? A parsimonious ontologist may deny that 
holes should be included in our ontological catalogue: out there in the world, there 
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really are no holes. But then we have a problem:  ‘ h ere are holes in pieces of Emmental 
cheese ’ is a truth of common sense, and for this truth to be true there must be holes 
in pieces of Emmental cheese  – thus, there must be holes. 
 How about our seventh item  – numbers, like 1.08  · 10 12 ? h ese also look very 
dif erent from concrete material objects. Saturn has a very large mass  – so large that 
it generates a gravitational i eld, which would attract you, should you get close 
enough. In fact, the number 1.08  · 10 12 is, so to speak, too light and thin to have any 
attractive force on you. It doesn ’ t even make much sense to wonder about the thinness 
of a number, as well as about its spatiotemporal location. Indeed, 1.08  · 10 12  does 
nothing physical to you: it is causally inert, as we may say.  
 But how can we know anything about things we cannot entertain causal 
relationships with? Can we even be sure that they are there? Even if we were freed 
from our contingent spatiotemporal limitations, we could never cross paths with 
1.08  · 10 12 , for it ’ s nowhere to be found in the physical world. Some may i nd 1.08  · 
10 12 and its peers to be too obnoxious to be admitted in our ontological list of the 
components of the world. Numbers, sets and other mathematical entities must simply 
not be included in our ontology, these parsimonious folks may claim. On the other 
hand, refusing to include numbers in our ontological catalogue may also bring 
problems. If there are no numbers, how could it be true that, as mathematics teaches 
us, seven is a prime number? h is can only be the case, as it seems, if there is a 
number (seven), which has the feature of being prime  – thus, if there are numbers. 
 How about  properties , such as fragility or ripeness, and biological  species , such as 
spiders and insects  – our candidate items no. 8 and no. 9? Considerations of 
ontological parsimony may lead some not to include them in the catalogue either. Of 
course there are material objects, some of which are ripe or fragile, some of which are 
human beings. Yet, why should we admit  fragility ,  ripeness or the species  homo 
sapiens , above and beyond the things which are fragile, ripe or human? Parsimonious 
ontologists might have arguments similar to the ones against numbers (properties 
and species are ot en grouped with mathematical objects under the broad label of 
 abstract objects , which we also used above, and opposed to concrete material beings). 
We see, touch and interact causally with human beings, fragile glasses and ripe 
bananas, but nobody has ever seen or touched fragility, ripeness or humanity. One 
may object. We also directly speak of species: we claim that some of them are cross-
fertile; and this can only be true if there are cross-fertile species, thus, if there are 
species. We also seem to know things about properties  – for instance, we know that 
fragility is a property of crystal glasses; and this demands that there be properties. 
 How about item 10 in the list?  Events  – things that happen  – make for another 
popular ontological category. Events seem ubiquitous in our daily life: Clinton ’ s af air 
with Lewinsky was scandalous, but Kennedy ’ s killing by Oswald was tragic; the 
French revolution was a momentous event, while Francesco ’ s watering his l owers 
yesterday just passed unnoticed. And unlike abstract objects, we cannot easily dismiss 
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events on the ground of their being devoid of causal powers. On the contrary, they 
seem to be the main actors of causal processes: we say that the throwing of a stone 
caused the breaking of the window, that the Clinton-Lewinsky af air caused the 
impeachment of the President, and that the latest solar l are caused the emission of 
billions of joules of energy in the Solar System. Events also present problems of their 
own, for instance, concerning the i ne-grainedness of their individuation. Francesco 
walks to the same oi  ce every working day; but is the event of Francesco ’ s walking to 
his oi  ce one single general event, which recurs many times across the year? Or are 
we talking of similar but distinct particular events, each with its own unique 
spatiotemporal setting? We may also have issues with the identity of the particular 
events themselves: is Oswald ’ s shooting the same as Kennedy ’ s killing? 
 Now notice that all of these concerns are not typical of disciplines like physics, 
mathematics or biology. Mathematicians talk about prime numbers; biologists talk 
about cross-fertile biological species; astrophysicists deal with solar l ares. But,  qua 
scientists, they will not typically wonder whether there really are prime numbers, 
species, properties or events  – whether these things ought to be included in the 
ontological catalogue. Nor will they wonder what it means to ask whether the world 
really includes these entities or not. Nor will they typically wonder what they themselves 
are ontologically involved with when they claim that there are ini nitely many prime 
numbers, or that genetic features are shared between spiders and insects.  
 Nor is common sense unqualii edly helpful in all of these issues  – even though, as 
we will see throughout this book, some ontologists take the deliverances of common 
sense, for example, as they show up in our ordinary talk, very seriously. Common 
sense ot en delivers vague, imprecise, ungrounded or occasionally inconsistent 
verdicts on the existence of various kinds of things. Here ’ s one example. It is 
commonsensical to maintain that everyday objects have parts that constitute them. 
Bananas have a peel and a pulp, normally endowed human beings have arms, legs and 
a head. Also, according to common sense, scattered material objects may constitute 
further objects. A slip and a bra for instance, can compose a further thing: a bikini. 
Yet it is not commonsensical to think that this can always happen: intuitively, there ’ s 
no object made up of Brad Pitt ’ s face and George Clooney ’ s body. So according to 
common sense, two objects sometimes compose a further one and sometimes do not. 
And there seems to be no commonsensical criterion to draw a principled line between 
the case in which bunches of material objects compose a further object as its parts, 
and the case in which they don ’ t. But we need such a criterion to build a well-motivated 
ontological catalogue. 
 Here philosophy steps in again. As we will see in the third part of our book, 
specii cally in Chapter 12, philosophical considerations may lead ontology to sharply 
depart from common sense on the question:  ‘ When does the inclusion of two material 
objects in our inventory force us to include also one further object, composed exactly 
of them? ’. A parsimonious ontologist may plainly deny the existence of bikinis by 
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claiming that what actually exists are just slips and bras. A bikini is nothing but a slip 
plus a bra: once we have counted the slip and a bra, there is no reason to countenance 
a further object, the bikini. But then, an even more parsimonious ontologist may 
claim, slips and bras are nothing but bunches of atoms and molecules arranged in a 
certain way. Once we have countenanced the (properly arranged) atoms and 
molecules, there is no reason to further countenance slips and bras. Worse: 
countenancing them may bring lots of troubles concerning their persistence across 
time and change and their spatial boundaries. It ’ s better to say that there really are no 
such things (we now see that, although ontologists look for the most general kinds of 
being, this does not prevent them from expressing their disagreements more 
concretely:  ‘ Unlike van Inwagen, I include bananas in my ontology ’  – not just 
subatomic particles arranged banana-wise: van Inwagen 2001: 3). 
 h ere seems to be room for philosophical work, then  – at least, if we are sensitive 
to issues like the ones just explored, for which physics and the special sciences, but 
also commonsensical shared beliefs, ot en deliver no clear verdicts. We may want to 
know whether apparently problematic entities like numbers, holes and properties 
can be admitted in our catalogue of the furniture of the world. If we don ’ t include 
them, we need to make sense of facts, truths and bits of knowledge apparently 
involving them. If we do include them, we need to answer objections of various kinds 
to their ontological respectability. 
 5 The rest of the book 
 h e book is neatly divided into two halves. Parts 1 and 2, making for the i rst half, 
focus on metaontology. h ere is a mainstream metaontological view among analytic 
philosophers: this is dealt with in Part 1. Its origins are traced back to Russell ’ s  On 
Denoting (Chapter 1), which provided the methodological paradigm of philosophical 
analysis for much of twentieth-century philosophy.  
 h e mainstream view, though, is usually labelled as  ‘ Quinean ’, for it is most clearly 
stated in such famous Quinean papers as  On What h ere Is . Chapter 2 explains the 
pivotal theses of Quine ’ s metaontology: that ontology ’ s key question is:  ‘ What is 
there? ’ ; that in some sense the question can be answered in one word,  ‘ Everything ’, 
for it is trivially true that everything exists, but in another sense it is not trivial at all; 
that it is inconsistent to make certain claims while holding that things of a certain 
kind do not exist (what is known as Quine ’ s  ‘ criterion of ontological commitment ’ ); 
that there is a principled way to settle debates about the existence of things like 
numbers, propositions, properties, etc.  
 Chapter 3 delves into the details of the standard metaontological view, as 
developed, for example, in Peter van Inwagen ’ s essays: being is not a (non-trivial) 
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feature of things; being just is existence; being or existence is univocal  – it means only 
one thing; the single sense of being is completely captured by the existential quantii er 
of elementary logic. It also deals with  ‘ paraphrase strategies ’ to get rid of ontological 
commitments apparently brought about by our everyday quantii cation over 
unwelcome kinds of things, and with the ontological import of so-called identity 
criteria, recaptured by Quine ’ s motto  ‘ No entity without identity. ’ 
 h e consensus about these matters is not universal. On the contrary, much top-
level contemporary work in metaontology starts by calling into question the standard 
view. Part 2 of the book explores reasons of dissatisfaction with it, and a range of 
alternative options. Here, Chapter 4 discusses two ways to depart from Quine ’ s 
framework. h e i rst, that of  ontological pluralists , agrees with Quine and van Inwagen 
that existence or being is captured by the quantii er, but holds that there is more than 
one mode or way of being, thus there is more than one (primitive) quantii er. Chairs 
and numbers, according to this view, both exist, but in two very dif erent ways, and a 
correct description of the world should take this into account.  Neo-Fregeans , on the 
other hand, think that linguistic categories, like that of singular term, are in some 
sense conceptually prior to ontological ones like that of object. h is leads to a view of 
the relationships between language and reality (broadly linked to the so-called 
 ‘ linguistic turn ’ of twentieth-century philosophy) with surprising results for the issue 
of the existence of abstract objects like numbers and directions.  
 Chapter 5 focuses on the view of ontology held by Quine ’ s master, Rudolf Carnap, 
and on its legacy for contemporary ontology. Carnap believed that it makes sense to 
ask about what there is only on the background of some conceptual and linguistic 
framework. Assuming the framework of material things, for instance, it makes sense 
to ask whether there is a skyscraper higher than the Empire State Building, as people 
ordinarily do. But to ask, as philosophers have traditionally done, whether there are 
material things in some  ‘ absolute ’ sense is to ask a very dif erent question. Carnap 
called questions of the i rst kind  internal and questions of the second kind  external . 
h is distinction, together with a certain del ationary attitude towards ontology 
associated with it, has been a source of inspiration for an amount of recent work in 
metaontology, ranging from the so-called  ‘ quantii er variance ’ view to proposals to 
the ef ect that we must distinguish an internal and an external reading of 
quantii cational expressions. 
 Chapter 6 introduces the burgeoning  i ctionalist strategies, according to which 
when we make claims that seem to commit us to the existence of controversial entities 
like numbers, possible worlds, properties, etc., we should not be taken at face value. 
h e i ctionalist motto has it that such claims can be  ‘ good without being true ’, and 
much work in this area consists in making this motto plausible. However, we speak of 
i ctionalist strategies, in the plural, for we will see in this chapter that i ctionalism has 
been developed in quite dif erent ways by its supporters.  
 Chapter 7 speaks of (neo-)Meinongian theories taking seriously the view that 
some things just do not exist (the name comes from Alexius Meinong, an Austrian 
Introduction: What Is Ontology? What Is Metaontology? 11
philosopher who held this view). (Neo-)Meinongians are unii ed by their disentangling 
the quantii ers from (automatic) existential commitment, but their views are 
otherwise diversii ed, too. In particular, they have dif erent non-quantii cational 
conceptions of the meaning of being as well as dif erent proposals on which non-
existent objects there are, and on which properties and features they can display. 
 Chapter 8 explores recent work on the notion of  grounding and its impact on the 
methodology of ontology. Advocates of the grounding approach tend to see reality as 
an ontologically hierarchical structure. h ey hold that the most important question 
about things of a given kind is not whether they exist, taken in the Quinean sense as 
a quantii cational question. Rather, the most important explanatory task for ontology 
has to do with which position such things occupy in the structure. Are they 
fundamental entities, or do they depend for their existence on entities of another 
kind, and if so, which kind?  
 Having investigated the issues of the meaning(s) of being and of the methodology 
of ontological inquiry, in Part 3 of the book, which occupies its second half in length, 
we give a closer look at how ontological investigations are actually carried out. Here, 
Chapters 9 and 10 are dedicated to abstract objects of dif erent kinds. Do objects like 
the number eighteen or Pythagoras ’ theorem really exist? And what about moral 
obligations: is there really something like a duty to keep your promise? On the one 
hand, abstract objects look peculiar: we cannot see, touch or smell them. h ey are 
apparently nowhere to be found in the material world surrounding us. On the other 
hand, is it really possible to renounce abstract objects like numbers and sets without 
renouncing mathematics? We will extensively review, in particular, the pros and cons 
of both  nominalist positions, which try to make sense of mathematics without 
admitting abstract objects, and of  platonist positions, which admit such objects and 
try to explain how knowledge of them is possible at all.  
 Is the actual world we are living in the only one there is? Talk of alternative ways 
the world could be or have been, also known as  possible worlds , is ubiquitous in 
analytical philosophy, for the notion is extremely helpful to analyse a number of key 
philosophical concepts. Since David Lewis called our attention to the ontological 
and metaphysical status of these entities, the debate on them has been lively. Lewis 
proposed to take possible worlds as (largely) concrete universes, causally and 
spatiotemporally isolated from each other, but of the same kind as the world we are 
living in. h e view was met with  ‘ incredulous stares ’ ; the literature provides a variety 
of arguments pro and, more ot en, against  ‘ Lewisian modal realism ’. A survey of this 
debate, provided in Chapter 11, is a must for an introduction to ontology. h e debate 
on modal realism has been traditionally conducted within a standard largely 
Quinean metaontological framework. However, we will see in this chapter that non-
standard metaontological views can provide fresh spin-of s to the discussion. 
 Another peculiar aspect of ontological debates emerges when one realizes that, as 
already hinted above in this Introduction, for prominent philosophers like Peter van 
Inwagen there are no such things as mid-size concrete, material objects like a banana 
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or a table, but just subatomic particles arranged as so. According to other prominent 
philosophers, like David Lewis, there are such weird entities as the  ‘ mereological 
fusion ’ (from the Greek  m é ros ,  ‘ part ’ ) of one ’ s head and one ’ s father ’ s body, i.e. that 
scattered thing whose parts are exactly one ’ s head and one ’ s father ’ s body. For Lewis, 
given any two entities  x and  y , there always is a (possibly scattered) entity  x  !  y , 
containing exactly them as parts. h ese views will be described in Chapter 12, devoted 
to the ontology and metaphysics of material objects. Other topics examined in that 
chapter include the issue of synchronic identity conditions for such objects (e.g., can 
more than one of them occupy one and the same place at the same time?) and the one 
of their diachronic identity (under which conditions do they  persist in time in spite of 
their undergoing change?). 
 Yet another topic in modern ontologists ’ agenda has to do with the status of 
 i ctional entities : things referred to and described in works of i ction, like Sherlock 
Holmes, Anna Karenina or Gandalf. Chapter 13 is dedicated to them: we will see 
there how, while (neo-)Meinongians declare such things to be non-existent, and 
i ctionalists apply to discourse on them their non-ontologically-committing 
techniques,  realist abstractionists on such objects accept that they really exist, but treat 
them as metaphysically peculiar abstract objects. 
 Finally, Chapter 14 presents two challenges to the view that the world is nothing 
but a collection of particular things like this chair, this table, this apple and so forth. 
It seems that things share features, which make for their similarities. Two red apples 
are similar in virtue of sharing the feature of being red. Moreover, the world we live 
in is not boring and static: lots of things happen in it. New persons are born, 
philosophers debate about ontology, people go to parties. Does not this sui  ce to 
show that we should also include in our ontological catalogue  properties , like the 
property of being red or that of being an apple, and  events , like births, debates and 
parties? If so, what are these things? Some philosophers take both kinds of things as 
 universals , that is, as things irreducible to particulars like individual apples and chairs, 
while others disagree. 
 h e agenda does not end here. Other entries considered by ontologists include 
works of art, or social objects (things like mortgages, institutions and money), just to 
mention a few items. Surely, then, this survey of ours is not complete. As Bertrand 
Russell said at the end of his  Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (Russell 1919): 
 ‘ there are innu merable unresolved problems in the subject, and much work needs to 
be done. If any student is led into a serious study  … by this little book, it will serve the 
chief purpose for which it has been written. ’ 
